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INTRODUCTION
"The sweetest sounds to mortals given
Are heard in Mother, Home, and Heaven."
-William Goldsmith Brown
On June 27,2001, RustyYates gently placed baby blankets inside
the coffins that held each of his five lifeless children.' Just days
earlier, his wife, Andrea Yates, had drowned all of their children in
a bathtub in the family's suburban Texas home.2 Andrea Yates has
since become the modern day poster child for maternal killings,
which are commonly classified as either infanticide (the killing of
an infant) or filicide (the killing of a child over the age of one).3
Yates's acts, and the legal saga4 that followed, spawned extensive
media coverage,5 popular discussion, and even an episode of Law &
Order: Criminal Intent.6 By the time police led Yates from her home
that day, she had already become "'the Medea' of Houston ... the
stuff of which myths were made."7 Although few cases of infanticide
and filicide receive the attention that Yates's did, such acts occur
1. SUZANNE O'MALLEY, "ARE YOU THERE ALONE?" THE UNSPEAKABLE CRIME OFANDREA
YATES 73 (2004).
2. Id. at 12-21.
3. LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, CHILD HOMICIDE: PARENTS WHO KILL 2
(2007).
4. In March of 2002, during her first trial, a Texas jury found Yates guilty. The Texas
Court of Appeals overturned the original verdict due to the materially false testimony of a
psychiatrist who testified on behalf of the prosecution. In a second trial, Yates again entered
not guilty pleas, and on July 26, 2006, the jury found Yates not guilty by reason of insanity
and committed her to a Texas mental hospital. See Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218-20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
5. O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 213 (stating that Yates received "maximum news
saturation" throughout her trials). The author covered Yates's story for media sources
including 0, The Oprah Magazine, New York Times Magazine, Salon.com, and Dateline NBC.
Id. at xiii.
6. Law & Order Criminal Intent: Magnificat (NBC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2004).
This episode was loosely based upon Yates's case and follows the plight of a woman who
attempts to kill her four sons while under the influence of severe postpartum depression. For
further discussion of the episode, see infra note 90 and accompanying text.
7. O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 12.
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with great frequency in the United States and abroad.' Every day,
some women choose to stab, drown, burn, beat, smother, or strangle
the infants and children who depend upon them for survival.9 Such
actions fly in the face of traditional conceptions of motherhood, yet
women who kill their children receive consistently light penalties
for their crimes."0
Maternal killings are treated as a lesser offense than general
homicide in the United States and are trivialized to an even greater
extent in places like England and Canada, where Infanticide Acts
automatically mitigate sanctions for mothers who kill.11 The same
good-natured jurisprudence does not extend to homicidal fathers.
When men murder their children, they receive far harsher penal-
ties than their female counterparts.12 Cases involving maternal
infanticide and filicide reveal a dangerous leniency toward female
defendants and a general desire to explain away female aggression.
In the wake of Yates's case, the use of postpartum psychosis as
a legal defense in cases of maternal infanticide and filicide has
received considerable attention. Postpartum psychosis refers to a
rare and serious mental disorder thought to occur after childbirth
in some women.' 3 Since the 1980s, American courts have allowed
women suffering from the disorder to raise the insanity defense.
Postpartum psychosis played a pivotal role in Yates's case, as
defense attorneys argued that the disorder caused Yates to kill her
8. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 3, at 132 ("According to National Vital
Statistics Reports, thousands of children under the age of [fourteen] are the victims of
homicide every year." (citation omitted)).
9. Some studies suggest that at least one infant is killed each day in the United States;
however, maternal infanticides remain among the most underreported and least well
documented deaths in the United States. Mary Overpeck, Epidemiology of Infanticide, in
INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN WHO KILL 19 (Margaret
G. Spinelli ed., 2003).
10. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
11. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American
Infanticide, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 3, 6 (2004) ("Ironically, in both historical and
contemporary societies, the tendency to treat infanticide as less heinous than other forms of
murder seldom is acknowledged, let alone explained.").
12. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
13. See Research on Postpartum Depression at the National Institute of Mental Health:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Dr. Catherine Roca, Chief, Woman's Program, National Institute of
Health).
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children.14 The jury ultimately agreed, and Yates received a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. 5 A number of other mothers
have been found not guilty on similar grounds."
Despite the rare nature of postpartum psychosis, recent discus-
sion tends erroneously to conflate all maternal killings with the
disorder. 7 Everyone from Congress 8 to Oprah Winfrey 9 to the
National Organization for Women (NOW)20 to the lay authors of
newspaper editorials2' has found something to say about the
14. See O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 138.
15. Yates Found Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, SEATrLE TIMES, July 27, 2006, at Al.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
17. See, e.g., April J. Walker, Application of the Insanity Defense to Postpartum Disorder-
Driven Infanticide in the United States: A Look Toward the Enactment of an Infanticide Act,
6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 197, 197 (2006) ("Over the past few years,
the phenomenon of mothers who kill their children has occurred with great frequency ....
These mothers are often suffering from postpartum disorders brought on by hormonal
changes associated with childbirth.') (footnotes omitted); Jessica Butterfield, Comment, Blue
Mourning: Postpartum Psychosis and the Criminal Insanity Defense, Waking to the Reality
of Women Who Kill Their Children 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 515, 517 (2006) ("What common
thread ties these women to one another? They were all suffering from postpartum psychosis
when they committed their unspeakable acts--when they killed their children."); Oprah.com,
Postpartum Psychosis, http://web.archive.org/web/20011107000529/www.oprah.com/tows/
coming/tows comemain.jhtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) ("What would cause a new mother
to kill her own baby or herself? A tragic illness we're just learning about: postpartum
psychosis.").
18. Recent legislation seeks to increase federal funding and activities relating to women
with postpartum mental disorders. On January 4,2007, Representative Bobby L. Rush (D-Il.)
introduced the Melanie Blocker-Stokes Postpartum Depression Research and Care Act, H.R.
20, 110th Cong. (2007), which would require the Director of the National Institute of Mental
Health to expand research and services relating to postpartum depression and psychosis. On
May 11, 2007, Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) introduced the "Mother's Act," aimed at
providing mandatory postpartum mental disorder screening, education, and other services
to women. Mom's Opportunity to Access Health, Education, Research, and Support for
Postpartum Depression Act, S. 1375, 110th Cong. (2007). The bills have since been
repackaged as The Melanie Blocker-Stokes MOTHERS Act and introduced as part of the
Advancing America's Priorities Act, S. 3297, 110th Cong. (2008).
19. See The Oprah Winfrey Show: When a Mother Secretly Thinks About Killing Her
Children (CBS Television broadcast July 11, 2005); see also Oprah.com, Postpartum
Psychosis, http://web.archive.orgtweb/20011107000529/www.oprah.com/tows/coming/tows-
come main.jhtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
20. See Press Release, National Organization for Women, Tragedy Focuses Attention on
Postpartum Psychosis (Sept. 6,2001), available at http://www.now.org/press/04-01/09-06.html
("The National Organization for Women is speaking out on the Andrea Yates case to call
attention to the need for better response by the medical community, law enforcement and
the judiciary to the problem of postpartum depression and psychosis.").
21. See, e.g., Rick Casey, Op-Ed., Mad Moms, Insane Law, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 19,
2004, at B1 (arguing for a change in the Texas insanity standard for women suffering from
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disorder. Postpartum psychosis has also arisen in recent legal
scholarship. Many scholars argue that the postpartum psychosis
defense, along with other postpartum mental disorder defenses,
should apply even more expansively to protect violent mothers from
undue punishment. Some argue for changes in current laws, such
as the development of a gender-specific insanity standard that
caters to the intricacies of postpartum psychosis.22 Others support
the enactment of an American Infanticide Act, which would
automatically mitigate sanctions for mothers who kill.23 Canada
and England have already passed such laws.24
This Note argues that recent proposals are both unnecessary and
misplaced, as they reflect outdated misconceptions about female
violence. Existing gender-neutral insanity standards have proven
effective in accommodating women with postpartum psychiatric
disorders and should not be changed.25 A significant number of
the effects of postpartum psychosis).
22. See, e.g., Brian D. Shannon, The Time Is Right to Revise the Texas Insanity Defense:
An Essay, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 67, 69 (2006) (arguing that the Texas insanity standard is
ineffectively narrow and relying for support primarily upon the fact that "in the Yates case,
the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was not returned until after two trials and
more than five years following the underlying tragic deaths"); Michele Connell, Note, The
Postpartum Psychosis Defense and Feminism: More or Less Justice for Women? 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 143, 162 (2002) ("A different legal insanity standard for a mother who kills her
child is an appropriate solution to meet the demands of equality and justice."); John Dent,
Comment, Postpartum Psychosis and the Insanity Defense, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355,367-68
(suggesting that the required standard of proof should be lowered in cases involving the
insanity defense and women who kill their children under the alleged effects of postpartum
psychosis); Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the
Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 718 (2003) ("[The failure of United States jurisdictions to
adopt an insanity test that incorporates postpartum psychotic women reflects the criminal
justice system's perpetual inability to accommodate female criminal offenders."); Michelle
R. Prejean, Comment, Texas Law Made This Mad Woman Sane, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1487,1501
(2006) ("Although postpartum psychosis could be a defense in and of itself, a better solution
is to rework the insanity defense so that it provides adequate remedies for women with
postpartum psychosis.").
23. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 17, at 220 (2006) ("Irrespective of the individual state's
insanity defense statute, each state should move toward enacting a separate infanticide
statute based on the defense of postpartum psychosis."); Butterfield, supra note 17, at 518
(proposing that "the United States look to international wisdom and, in the years to come,
develop and adopt a statute specific to infanticide committed by mothers suffering from
postpartum mental disorders").
24. Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1(1) (Eng.); R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 233 (Can.).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 169-75.
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female defendants, including Yates, have successfully raised
postpartum psychosis as a legal defense, even in jurisdictions that
apply the most stringent insanity standards.26 Similar defenses
have not been applied to fathers who kill their children.27
The states have no need to enact an Infanticide Act or other
gender-specific laws. Although some evidence of disparate results
exists in cases involving postpartum psychosis,2" a gender-specific
approach will not ensure a more equitable outcome. Any disparity
stems not from inadequacies in available laws or the insanity
standard itself, but from a dangerous societal ambivalence toward
mothers who kill. Feminist theorists argue that violent women
occupy an ambiguous position, as they disrupt and challenge
cultural ideals concerning femininity.29 Violence remains a mascu-
line realm, and female aggression is deemed the rare result of
mental disorder.3" Consequently, American laws already reflect a
number of misconceptions about women and violence. 3' There is no
need to promote further leniency toward female offenders.
Part I of this Note will explore the extent to which cultural values
concerning femininity have influenced the societal response to
infanticide and filicide. This section will provide an overview of
feminist legal theory and its relation to cases involving mothers
who kill. Part I will also address the role that traditional notions of
femininity played in Yates's trials. Lastly, this section will describe
the ways in which the American legal system has already incorpo-
rated popular misconceptions about female violence into its
jurisprudence.
26. See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 66-68, 199-201 and accompanying text.
28. Some have argued that current insanity standards create disparate outcomes for
female defendants suffering from postpartum psychosis. See, e.g., Connell, supra note 22, at
144 ("The wide range of verdicts in similar cases indicates society's and the legal system's
ambivalence about postpartum psychosis as a criminal defense.").
29. See, e.g., HILARY NERONI, THE VIOLENT WOMAN: FEMININITY, NARRATIVE, AND
VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CINEMA 59 (2005) ("[F]emale violence doesn't fit
conveniently into our ideas of the feminine, and, because of this, it has a disruptive and
traumatic impact, as reactions to violent women in history bear out.").
30. See PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS BAD: VIOLENT WOMEN AND THE MYTH OF
INNOCENCE 7 (1997) ("The sole explanation offered up by criminologists for violence commit-
ted by women is that it is involuntary, the rare result of provocation or mental illness .... ").
31. See infra Part I.E.
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Part II will outline the reasons why the states should avoid
adopting an Infanticide Act. By critiquing existing Infanticide Acts
in both England and Canada, this section will demonstrate that
such statutes are not only premised upon the faulty presumption
that all maternal killings result from the hormonal side effects of
childbirth, but also reflect the misplaced belief that women should
be treated lightly for violent crimes.
Part III will argue that American jurisdictions should not develop
gender-specific insanity standards for women suffering from
postpartum psychosis because: (a) current gender-neutral insanity
standards have proven effective in accommodating women who
suffer from postpartum psychosis; (b) the use of a gender-specific
standard promotes dangerous leniency toward female defendants;
and (c) a gender-specific standard would embrace and perpetuate
false ideas about women and violence. This section will address the
reasons for disparate results in some cases and outline the risks
inherent in changing the insanity standard to a gender-specific
model.
If American laws further cater to misplaced beliefs about
femininity and violence, women will remain imprisoned in a system
that deprives them of any real agency or power. A legal system that
embraces such beliefs fails to treat the real causes of female
violence and denies the value of the victims of female violence.
I. POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS AND CULTURAL VALUES CONCERNING
FEMININITY
A. Feminist Legal Theory and Mothers Who Kill
Feminist legal theory provides an alternative means of viewing
mothers who kill and the responses their acts elicit. In general,
feminist legal theory functions as a metanarrative to mainstream
legal theory by critiquing and examining its theoretical models and
constructs." Scholars who embrace feminist legal theory seek to
32. BELINDA MORRISSEY, WHEN WOMEN KILL: QUESTIONS OF AGENCY AND SUBJECTIVITY
20 (2003). Feminist legal theory and practice fall into three primary phases: the first phase,
beginning in the 1960s, was empirical feminism; the second phase, beginning in the 1980s,
was standpoint feminism; the third and more recent phase is that of postmodern feminism,
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identify ways in which the law has contributed to female subordina-
tion and modify legal approaches to gender issues. Feminist legal
theory is therefore both reactive and reformative.3"
Feminist legal theorists have long recognized that both the media
and legal system treat male and female murderers differently. In
general, violence does not comport with societal conceptions of
femininity.34 Criminologists attempt to explain away the acts of
violent women as the "rare result of provocation or mental illness. 35
This explanation, however, relies upon the faulty conception that
women are inherently passive-that "half the population of the
globe consist[s] of saintly stoics who never succum[b] to fury,
frustration, or greed."36 Such notions are unrealistic and outdated.
Although the myth of female passivity is "one of the most abiding
myths of our time," it is not grounded in reality.3 7 To the contrary,
women commit a number of violent crimes, and they do so with
disturbing frequency. Unlike male violence, female violence often
occurs within the confines of the home. The victims of female
violence are most often spouses, children, and other family mem-
bers. For instance, statistics indicate that:
Women commit the majority of child homicides in the United
States, a greater share of physical child abuse, an equal rate of
sibling violence and assaults on the elderly, about a quarter of
child sexual abuse, an overwhelming share of the killings of
newborns, and a fair preponderance of spousal assaults.38
Despite this reality, violence remains a uniquely "male" behavior.39
which has been influenced by the work of Foucault and Derrida. See id. at 20-21.
33. Id. at 20 ("Much of this work is reformative of particular laws and legal principles.
It is also reactive, responding to developments in the discourse of law.").
34. NERONI, supra note 29, at 59.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 7.
38. Id.
39. See id. ("Violence is still universally considered to be the province of the male.
Violence is masculine. Men are the cause of it, and women and children the ones who
suffer.").
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Although male murderers are recognized, and even glorified in
some cases, 40 women remain within the constraints of a limited
good girl/bad girl dichotomy. The discussion of violent women often
focuses heavily on what it means to be female, and the criminal act
in question fades into the background.4' Ideological fantasy, rooted
in the good girl/bad girl dichotomy, works to mold violent women
"back into what a woman should be."42 A woman therefore behaves
violently only as the result of external forces beyond her control
("madness") or because she is simply not a true woman ("badness").
Although "mad" women remain "morally 'pure"' and otherwise con-
form to "traditional gender roles and notions of femininity," this is
not true of "bad" women.43 "Bad" women usually have not con-
formed to societal standards; as a result of their deviance, they are
inherently unwomanly. Stereotypes preserve traditional definitions
of femininity by either stripping all agency from "mad" women who
commit violent acts or removing "bad" women from the female
realm. In this way, ideological fantasy allows notions of female
passivity and nonviolence to persist.
Mothers who kill their own children present an even more
troubling challenge to cultural ideals concerning femininity. If
murderous females occupy an ambiguous place in the Western
symbolic system, women who kill their own young upset the very
foundation of the system. In patriarchal societies, femininity
remains linked with the ideal of virtuous motherhood.44 Perhaps the
most common trope is that of the 'Mother-Woman ... deified by the
Catholic Madonna," which has its roots in the basic constructs of
Western society.45 The concept of a "unique mother-child bond" has
40. MORRISSEY, supra note 32, at 17 ("[W]hen a man kills he can expect that his crime
will be both imaginable and possibly even seen as human. Indeed, male crime in all forums,
from the fictional to the factual, is frequently articulated, debated, portrayed, glorified, even
fantasized.").
41. NERONI, supra note 29, at 60 ('The public discussion surrounding so many cases of
violent women, both past and present, seems to be less about justice or the act in question
than about what it is to be a woman....").
42. Id. at 62.
43. CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN 69-70
(2001).
44. PHYLLIS CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS 83 (2005) ("In patriarchal culture, Mother-
Women ... are as removed from (hetero) sexual pleasure as are Daughter-Women.").
45. See id. at 83-84 (suggesting that "Mary symbolizes power achieved through recep-
tivity, compassion, and a uterus").
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come and gone throughout history, but it resurged with great force
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 6 From this period
onward, women began "to symbolize the nurturant safety of the
home. 47 They became endowed with "attributes of softness and
sentimentality," which have remained a vital part of the feminine
ideal.48 As divisions between men and women in the workforce
became more pronounced, sharper divisions between male and
female character attributes followed. 9 These divisions still exist,
and cultural definitions of femininity remain linked with "female"
attributes.
As such, crimes like Yates's prove entirely antithetical to the
cultural understandings of femininity and motherhood in a
patriarchal society. 50 Mothers nurture; they do not destroy. The
need to explain away the actions of violent mothers therefore proves
even stronger than that of other violent women.5' The suggestion
that a mother, "the gate keeper to your soul, the nurturer of your
mind and body would ever purposely harm you" is often unfathom-
able.52 To believe that a mother could harm her own children
"would alter the natural order in the world in the same way the
moon changes the tides."53 As the author of a Houston newspaper
editorial opined following Yates's trial: "For a mother to kill her
babies so goes against nature that she should be assumed to be
doing it out of insanity unless there is evidence that she had some
other motive."5 4 Traditional definitions of motherhood leave no room
for the possibility of violence. As a result, "legal and media narra-
tives of murders committed by women indicate these acts are ...
46. See PEARSON, supra note 30, at 75 (explaining that, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, "a division of labor between the sexes intensified in the shift from an agrarian to
an industrial society").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. ("As labor divisions grew starker, so did the character attributes of gender.").
50. See Connell, supra note 22, at 144.
51. MORRISSEY, supra note 32, at 166 (arguing that mothers who kill remind all members
of society of their "initial vulnerability and dependence on the whims and caprices of the
women who care for them").
52. Stuart S. Gordon, Mothers Who Kill Their Children, 6 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 86, 86
(1998).
53. Id.
54. Casey, supra note 21.
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traumatic for heteropatriarchal societies."55 Legal and media dis-
courses therefore attempt to "narrate, understand, and resolve"
such acts in a manner that reduces their traumatic impact.56
B. The Insanity Defense and Female Offenders
The insanity defense serves as one means by which violent
women are legally pathologized and endowed with false passivity.
The availability of the insanity defense to criminal defendants
reflects the primary justification for punishment in American
jurisdictions: "that offenders have made a voluntary choice to break
the law."57 A defendant's degree of culpability lessens when she fails
to act of her own volition; the need for punishment, at least in a
retributive sense, diminishes. The general willingness to apply the
defense to women who kill their children points to pervasive myths
of female nonviolence at work in the law. In the United States, the
criminal justice system "is firmly rooted in the concept of individual
free will," and the system relies heavily upon the assumption that
individuals should be held responsible for their own actions.58
Myths of female passivity are so pervasive and encompassing that
they eliminate concerns about free will and criminal accountability
from the discussion of many female offenders.
When women kill, judges and juries often fall prey to the "strong
tendency to view these crimes as arising out of external circum-
stances, and therefore to resist equating these homicides with
murder."59 The insanity defense caters to this tendency, which
stems from the subconscious need to reduce the violent woman's
traumatic impact. The insanity defense enables female violence to
coexist comfortably with traditional notions of femininity. It also
promotes empathy toward violent women, whose aberrance becomes
a result of external factors rather than conscious choice. It is worth
55. MORRISSEY, supra note 32, at 2 ("For the fear of women, of their power to generate
life and take it away, runs deep in male dominated societies.").
56. Id.
57. Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact
of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DuKE L.J. 1031, 1031 (2003). Jones goes on to note that
traditional justifications for punishment include deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. Id. at 1037-38.
58. Id. at 1033.
59. Oberman, supra note 11, at 6.
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noting that women who commit violent acts, and the lawyers who
defend them, "have no stake in correcting our impression of
innocence," as their successful use of the insanity defense allows
women to escape guilty sentences and harsh criminal penalties.6 °
The current approach to female violence has a number of serious
implications. The denial of female aggression both "reinforce[s] the
notion that female violence is unreal" and "preserv[es] ideas of
female oppression."'" In deeming violent women, especially
mothers, "mad," the law transforms female perpetrators into
helpless victims.62 Although their male counterparts are often
recognized as active aggressors, violent women emerge in media
and legal portrayals as "passive and rather deranged little robots
who imperil themselves on cue."6
Such depictions have detrimental effects on the overall status of
women in society. A number of feminist legal theorists argue that
the tendency to deny female aggression prevents women from
gaining full equality and citizenship in their communities64 as
female defendants "remain locked in the male autonomy/female
passivity model which comprehends the actions of both genders
unsatisfactorily and incompletely."65 The denial of female aggres-
sion also poses problems from a criminal responsibility perspective,
as women escape liability and punishment for actions that men do
not. Statistics reveal that men receive consistently harsher criminal
penalties than their female counterparts.6 Women are particularly
60. Id. at 54.
61. MORRISSEY, supra note 32, at 7, 25.
62. Mental disorders appear to have definite links with societal conceptions of gender.
See, e.g., CHESLER, supra note 44, at 116 ("Terhaps what we consider 'madness,' whether it
appears in women or men, is either the acting out of the devalued female role or the total or
partial rejection of one's sex-role stereotype.").
63. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 23.
64. See MORRISSEY, supra note 32, at 21 ("[Unless women can be considered to possess
full human (as opposed to mythic) agency, responsibility and culpability for their crimes ...
they continue to lack complete citizenship in their communities." (citations omitted)).
65. Id. at 168.
66. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 61 ("In 1987, twenty-two out of every one hundred
persons arrested for 'serious crimes' in the United States were women. Yet only ten out of
one hundred persons convicted for serious crimes were women, and five out of one hundred
persons imprisoned for those crimes were women. In 1986, 48 percent of New York women
convicted of homicide actually went to prison, whereas 77 percent of men did. By 1991, a
Phoenix, Arizona, study of 2,500 felony offenders found that men were twice as likely as
women to be incarcerated, and women were significantly more likely than men to plead
710 [Vol. 50:699
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unlikely to receive the death penalty for their violent acts.67 Studies
also suggest that men are as much as 11 percent more likely than
women to be incarcerated for violent offenses.68
C. Dangerous Impact of the Denial of Female Violence on the
Justice System
When the legal system caters to outdated stereotypes about
femininity, it does more than perpetuate false ideas about women
and violence; it overlooks the value of the infants and children
women kill.69 At its worst, the denial of female aggression allows
the entire criminal justice system to turn a blind eye on women who
deserve punishment and victims who need protection. The disturb-
ing saga of the Tinning family offers just one example.
Over the course of fourteen years, Marybeth Tinning, a New York
mother, killed eight of her nine children without any intervention
from the criminal justice system.7" Even after three of her children
died, no one suspected foul play from the quiet woman. Instead,
people "pitied and admired Marybeth," as three more of her
children died over the following years.7' No one believed that a
mother could kill her own children. Even the children's pediatri-
cians "were stalwart in their support of her."72 But when a criminal
investigation finally began after the death of Tinning's ninth child,
she confessed to killing three of her children.73
guilty to a reduced charge, across all offense categories.").
67. Id. ("Of 103 women sentenced to death in the United States since 1977, one has been
executed; 47 remain on death row; the remainder were transferred out.").
68. Id. at 62.
69. See id. at 89 (suggesting that infants "are perceived, on some level, as mere
extensions of women-owned by them" and that society is more likely to condemn a woman
who kills an older child, as "[t]he child, as opposed to the baby, is the most cherished of all
potential victims in our society"). This raises important questions about the general status
of infant rights in other areas including abortion and infant euthanasia. See, e.g., Philip
Montague, Infant Rights and the Morality of Infanticide, 23 Nofis 63 (1989) ("Discussions of
infanticide typically center, therefore, on the idea that possessing certain properties is
necessarily correlated with having a right to life....').
70. See PEARSON, supra note 30, at 92-102.
71. Id. at 96.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 94.
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In a similar Australian case, a woman killed each of her four
children over a period of several years, and authorities failed to
investigate any of the first three deaths as a potential homicide. 4
They accepted the mother's word that each of the children had
suffered from sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), when in
reality she had planned and orchestrated their murders. Only when
the woman's husband discovered her secret diary did anyone
suspect that she could have committed such unthinkable acts.75
Indeed, society seems implicitly to "permit a maternal sphere of
influence over our youngest citizens," even when such influence
lends itself to vast tragedy.76
D. Issues of Femininity and Violence in Yates's Trials
Yates's trials provide a powerful example of the extent to which
cultural values concerning femininity have influenced the societal
response to maternal killings. The trials ultimately turned on
traditional notions of femininity, motherhood, and violence.
Prosecutors argued that Yates acted of her own volition and
recognized the nature of her actions.7 Yates's defense counsel, on
the other hand, repeatedly drew upon normative female roles in
order to strip Yates of agency and invoke the jury's sympathy.
George Parnham, Yates's defense attorney, tapped into the jury's
disbelief that a mother could act violently, asserting that it should
be assumed she acted out of insanity. During his opening state-
ment, Parnham asked the jury: "How does a mother who has given
birth, who has nurtured, who has protected, and who has loved the
five children that she brought into this world, interrupt their
lives? '7' The answer to this question, according to Parnham, is that
she could not have done so unless she was psychotic.
79
74. See Michele Mandel, Murder in the Nursery, TORONTO SUN, May 23, 2003, at 20.
75. Id.
76. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 89.
77. O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 204 ("Andrea Yates took that control over her life that
day. She ... wasn't doing this ... except for motivation only she knows .... Andrea Yates is
responsible. She knew it was wrong.').
78. Transcript of Opening Statements in Andrea Yates Trial, CNN.com, Feb. 18, 2002,
http://transcripts.cnn.comITRANSCRIPTS/O202/18/se.O2.html.
79. See id.
712 [Vol. 50:699
MURDEROUS MADONNA
The jury later heard evidence of what the defense believed really
drove Yates to kill her children: the woman's "mental disease and
or defect."' The defense team hoped to prove to the jury that "[b]ut
for the psychosis, she would never have considered, much less acted
upon, any thought to take the lives of the children she bore into this
world and dearly loved as their mother."'" Yates's attorneys
appealed aptly to the temptation to disbelieve and explain away
female violence-especially that as heinous as Yates's. Their theory
relied heavily upon the traumatic impact of a violent mother's
actions.
Yates appears as a highly sympathetic character, even as a
victim of sorts, in other media and academic portrayals. Calls for
sympathy and support for Yates occur with far greater frequency
than any recognition of the reality that Yates's children faced in
their final moments. In fact, many commentaries simply ignore the
gruesome details of the murders. There is little discussion of the
fact that even the smallest of the children ran, struggled, and
fought back as their mother pushed them facedown into the water
and held their heads until they could no longer breathe, until their
little lungs literally exploded in their chests.82 Likewise, few reports
make any mention of what Rusty Yates must have experienced in
the hours that he spent waiting outside his home on the afternoon
of his children's murders, unable to enter or see his own children. 3
Instead, many people call for encouragement and support of
Yates. The murders are portrayed as a tragedy "for Yates herself,"
considering that "she will always carry the emotional burden of
having killed her fiV6 children."' One author writes: 'We can only
imagine her torment once the psychiatric medications she now must
take began flooding the synapses of her brain and she realized the
80. Id.
81. Paul Duggan, Mental Illness Is Focus of Yates Jury Selection, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2002, at A3 (quoting George Parnham).
82. See O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 15-20.
83. See id. at 7 ("Yates got up off the ground and, in his pain, grabbed a plastic yard chair
and threw it at nothing in particular. Then he fell to the ground again and coiled into a fetal
position, still screaming.").
84. Phillip J. Resnick, The 2006 Friedman & Gilbert Criminal Justice Forum: The
Andrea Yates Case: Insanity on Trial, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 147, 155 (2007).
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full consequences of her actions."85 A woman who kills her children
apparently "suffer[s] tremendously. Maybe not as much as her
children suffered. Maybe as much.""6 Even Yates's own husband
ultimately viewed her as a victim, worthy of society's pity: 'The way
I look at Andrea is as a child that I've lost custody of to a mother
[the penal system] I don't like or trust."" A woman who kills her
own child gains the jury's sympathy on some level because she has
already lost, in the eyes of many, her "most valuable possession."88
When madness and sickness enter the picture, mothers who
kill become even more sympathetic. This troubled jurisprudence
is reflected in the responses of juries, who "frequently cry when
delivering verdicts in infanticide cases ... regardless whether their
decision is innocence or guilt.""9 In the Law & Order episode based
upon Yates's case, characters echo similar sentiments for the
fictional mother who attempts to kill her four sons. One character
empathizes with the woman, stating that: "packing and moving
after a C-section with a newborn, that must have been torture."'
The response to Yates's case provides evidence of the tendency to
victimize women and deny their violent actions. The states have no
need to craft laws that will further cater to the tendency to view
violent women in highly sympathetic terms.
E. The Institutionalization of Female Passivity and Nonviolence
in American Law
The American legal system has already incorporated misconcep-
tions about women and violence into its jurisprudence in many
ways. A number of laws seek to protect women from men, and
special legal defenses allow women to escape liability for their own
violent actions. Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act
85. Janet Boivin, Show Your Support, NURSE.cOM, Feb. 11, 2008, http://include.nurse.
comlappspbcs.dllIarticle?AID=/20080211/IL02/80206040.
86. Gordon, supra note 52, at 103.
87. O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 247.
88. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 89.
89. Id.
90. Law & Order Criminal Intent: Magnificat (NBC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2004).
In the episode, the District Attorney also states: "You're talking about a mother planning a
murder so heinous it is incomprehensible. Mothers don't just go into a homicidal spiral. The
grand jury will want to know why." Id.
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(VAWA) in 1994, which provides, in part, a federal civil rights cause
of action for crimes of violence motivated by gender.9' In 2005, a
man attempted to apply for a grant to fund a program that provides
homes for male victims of spousal abuse, but his request was denied
by the VAWA Office. 92 He received a letter stating that his proposal
had been rejected because it "focused on serving men who are
victims of domestic violence." 93 In response to criticism, Senator
Biden, the lawmaker who sponsored VAWA, maintained strenu-
ously that the law applies to both sexes.94 Department of Justice
guidelines for grants under the Act tell a different story: "To reflect
Congress's focus on violence against women ... states must fund
only programs that focus on violence against women."95 This view
of VAWA reflects the misguided belief that women are always
victims and men are always perpetrators of violent crimes.
Criminal statutes also reflect disparate ideas about male and
female violence. For instance, laws relating to domestic abuse
reflect the notion that men kill as the result of anger and women
only do so as the result of fear and despair.9" A specific legal
defense, based on Battered Woman Syndrome encompasses this
notion. The defense allows women to escape punishment for acts of
domestic violence97 and applies to a woman who kills her male
partner after a lengthy period of cyclical abuse, during which she
becomes unable to take rational steps to remove herself from the
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
92. Jesse Chaderdon, Biden pressed to make abuse bill gender neutral, HOCKESSIN
COMMUNITY NEWS, June 2, 2005, at 8, available at http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/
BidenOnGenderNeutralVAWAHCN06.02.05.pdf.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. (quoting Department of Justice guidelines) (emphasis added). Even though states
may fund only programs focusing on violence against women, the guidelines go on to state
that "programs must provide to a similarily situated male victim in need." Id.; see also
RESPECTING ACCURACY IN DOMESTIC ABUSE REPORTING (RADAR), VAWA PROGRAMS
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST MALE VICTIMS (2007), available at http://www.mediaradar.org/
docs/RADARreport-VAWA-Discriminates-Against-Males.pdf (suggesting that "[dliscrim-
ination [against men] begins at the highest levels--the federal and state governments").
96. Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United
States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 27, 28 (2006) ("Men who
commit domestic homicide by killing intimate or former intimate partners often do so out of
jealousy, possessiveness and rage-in the heat of passion. Women who commit domestic
homicide often kill out of fear and despair-they kill their batterers.").
97. See LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 202-03 (2d ed. 2000).
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situation.9" Much like the postpartum psychosis defense, the
battered woman's defense labels female murder "the irrational
product of a mental health disorder."99
The defense may also reflect a construction of marriage as a
"hierarchical relationship," in which women are subordinated and
men have "the authority to govern both themselves and their
irresponsible wives."' ° The criminal law generally requires that
men resist the pressures that would otherwise drive them to
commit crimes, including the behavior of a spouse.' The law
constructs women, on the other hand, as "incapable of choosing
lawful conduct when faced with unlawful influence from their
spouses."' ' 2 In addition, the criminal justice system offers no special
gender-specific protections for men. The battered woman defense
and postpartum psychosis defense are the products of a system that
tends to reject and explain away female violence.
In addition to the above defenses, other criminal statutes
explicitly deny the possibility of certain types of female violence.' 0 '
For instance, the majority of rape statutes in American jurisdictions
traditionally incorporated gender-specific language, criminalizing
only acts of sexual violence committed by men. In the past few
years, many states have begun to adopt gender-neutral statutes.
This is not the case in every jurisdiction, however, and a number of
states still adhere to traditional definitions. Maryland, for instance,
continues to define rape as forceful vaginal intercourse.'04 As such
laws reveal, current jurisprudence has already institutionalized
myths of female non-violence in a number of ways. In the wake of
98. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371-73 (N.J. 1984) ("The cyclical nature of
battering behavior helps explain why more women simply do not leave their abusers.").
99. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (quotations omitted)
("The criminal law has been content to excuse women for criminal misconduct on the
ground that they cannot be expected to ... resist the influence exerted by their husbands. No
similar excuse has ever been afforded to men.").
100. Id. at 5-6.
101. See id. at 5.
102. Id. at 6.
103. See Paul J. Mirabile, Comment, Rape Laws, Equal Protection, and Privacy Rights,
54 TUL. L. REv. 456, 457 (1980) ("A typical state statute of long standing provides that 'rape'
is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.").
104. MD. CODEANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-303(a)(1), 3-304(a) (2007); see also Model Penal Code
§ 213.1 (1962).
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the frenzy prompted by Yates's case, the temptation to further
indulge such myths must be kept in check.
II. ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ENACTMENT OF AN AMERICAN
INFANTICIDE ACT
In the years following Yates's high profile case, there has been
discussion of the possible enactment of an American Infanticide
Act. °  An Infanticide Act would automatically mitigate sanctions
for mothers who kill their children following childbirth. Although
England and Canada have done so, American jurisdictions should
not adopt a law that automatically mitigates sanctions for women
who kill their children. A review of the British and Canadian Acts
reveals that existing Infanticide Acts are premised upon the faulty
presumption that all maternal killings result from the effects of
childbirth and reflect the misplaced belief that women should be
treated lightly for violent crimes.
A. Faulty Presumption that All Maternal Killings Result from the
Effects of Childbirth
Although maternal infanticide and filicide have existed for
centuries, they became highly medicalized at the start of the twen-
tieth century.'0 6 At that time, two French psychiatrists "posited a
causal relationship between pregnancy, childbirth, and subsequent
maternal mental disorder."'0 7 Their research changed the way
twentieth-century society viewed infanticide, and maternal killings
have since become closely associated with mental illness.'08 England
quickly passed statutes that classified infanticide as a "distinct
form of homicide due to the impact of pregnancy and birth upon the
mother's mental status."'0' 9 The British Infanticide Act, first enacted
105. See supra note 23.
106. Maternal killings are not a new phenomenon. Infanticide and filicide have occurred
for centuries in nearly every corner of the world. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 43, at
1-10.
107. Id. at 11. England embraced this concept and "recognized infanticide as a distinct
form of homicide due to the impact of pregnancy and birth upon the mother's mental status."
Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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in 1922, mitigates the punishment attached to a manslaughter
charge when a woman kills her child during the first year of its
life." ° The Act operates upon the "presumption that women who
kill their children within the first twelve months of life are ill""'
and supports the assumption that hormones cause "all maternal
aggression against infants.""' 2 The Act accordingly instructs a jury
to return a verdict of infanticide, rather than murder, when it finds
that the lack of a full recovery from childbirth caused an imbalance
in a woman's mind."' As such, the Act perpetuates the faulty
presumption that all maternal killings result from hormonal
imbalances or other uniquely female defects.
The Canadian Infanticide Act also provides broad protection
for mothers who commit murder in the year following childbirth
through a separate and lesser charge of infanticide." 4 In Canada,
a woman does not need to prove that her actions resulted from
mental defect; she need only prove that she suffered from some type
of general mental disturbance during the general period."' The
Canadian Act does not define the degree of disturbance necessary,
nor does it require any formal diagnosis. Additionally, a woman
need not prove that she suffered from a distinctly "postpartum"
disorder."' As is the case in England, a Canadian mother's burden
of proof is very low; her word is all that the law requires. The
government, on the other hand, must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that a woman had fully recovered from childbirth at the time
of the killing and that she did not act while under "the effects of
giving birth."' 7 As this burden is nearly impossible to meet,"' the
Canadian Act effectively excuses all acts of maternal aggression
during the first year following childbirth, regardless of whether
they truly resulted from serious postpartum mental disorders.
110. Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1(1) (Eng.).
111. Walker, supra note 17, at 204.
112. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 80.
113. Infanticide Act § 1(2); see also PEARSON, supra note 30, at 80.
114. See KIRSTEN JOHNSON KRAMER, UNWILLING MOTHERS, UNWANTED BABIES:
INFANTICIDE IN CANADA 72 (2005).
115. See R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 233 (Can.).
116. See Walker, supra note 17, at 204.
117. Id. at 206.
118. Id.
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There is little, if any, conclusive evidence that all maternal
aggression in the year following childbirth results from hormonal
imbalances. Indeed, the troubling reality is that "[r]esearch on ma-
ternal aggression is stunningly scant."'19 To date, a clear biological
link does not exist between hormones and female violence. 2 ' In the
United States, medical experts continue to disagree as to whether
postpartum disorders actually cause women to harm their
children.' 2 ' What remains absolutely clear, however, is that not all
acts of infanticide and filicide can be explained by postpartum
disorder. 122 Even if hormonal disturbances account for some violent
actions, this cannot be true of all cases of infanticide. The bulk of
maternal killings occur for other unrelated reasons-many of which
display some degree of rational intent. 2 ' Existing Infanticide Acts
ignore this reality and universally excuse the murderous behavior
of all criminal mothers. The Acts make no attempt to differentiate
between individual cases of infanticide.'24 The blanket protection
afforded by the two Acts renders nonexistent the possibility that a
mother could premeditate and deliberately choose to kill her infant.
The history of infanticide and filicide reveals the erroneous
underpinnings of the existing Acts. Women have committed crimes
against their children since antiquity, and they have done so for a
variety of reasons, many of which reveal clear and rational intent.
For instance, rates of infanticide have often spiked as a result of
societal pressures and stigmas. In the Middle Ages, many women
killed their non-marital children to avoid the stigma attached to
illegitimacy.'25 In China, during the Qing Dynasty of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the preference for sons in wealthy
families "caused a shocking increase in female infanticide among
119. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 79.
120. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 158.
122. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 3, at 130 ("There are cases in which postpartum
disorder is not at the root of infanticide or fihcide.").
123. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
124. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 43, at 17 (pointing out that many modern
societies regard infanticide as a "uniform crime," and treat it as "a manifestation of illness
or as a manifestation of evil").
125. Id. at 8-9 ("Common law protects legitimate children .... The nonmarital child was
denied all these rights. As a result, they often became the victims of infanticide.").
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dynastic families."'26 In early Muslim culture, the Muslim dowry
system "constitute [d] a powerful explanation for the persistence of
female infanticide."'27 Women kill their children out of desperation,
anger, and for a variety of other reasons. "Hormones" do not
account for all of the acts of infanticide that have occurred through-
out history, and they do not account for all of the violent crimes that
continue to occur each day against infants and children.
128
The British and Canadian Acts also fail to differentiate between
the various types of postpartum mental disorders. The Acts rely
upon the presumption that any type of postpartum mental illness
can result in murder. In reality, however, a number of different
postpartum disorders exist. Only in the most severe cases are
women unable to control their behavior. Postpartum psychosis,
which occurs in one to four women per 1000, is the most serious
and rare postpartum disorder.'29 Postpartum psychosis may result
in delusions, hallucinations, and a loss of reality. 3 ° Only in rare
instances, however, does postpartum psychosis render a woman
unable to appreciate the difference between right and wrong.' 3 ' The
more common type of postpartum disorder is postpartum depres-
sion, which occurs to some extent in 60 to 80 percent of new
mothers in the weeks following delivery.'32 A catch-all term,
postpartum depression encompasses everything from the minor
"baby blues" to a more severe form of depression, which may last up
to two years after childbirth.'33
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id. at 5.
Before the Muslim invasion, a Hindu father commonly gave his new son-in-law
a gift for the purpose of starting a new life with his daughter. When the
Muslims invaded, a downturn in economic conditions increased the difficulty of
finding a bridegroom .... Eventually, at least in India, dowry became a
mechanism for extortion .... As a result, even in contemporary Indian culture,
the birth of a daughter triggers the pressure of saving a suitable dowry ....
Among poor rural families, the persistence of female infanticide is attributable
to precisely this fear.
Id.
128. See MARGARET G. SPINELLI, INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
ON MOTHERS WHO KILL 10 (2003).
129. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 3, at 155.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 118.
133. Id.
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Existing Infanticide Acts do not distinguish between women
who suffer from severe forms of postpartum psychosis and those
who have only the "baby blues" or some other form of depression
with postpartum onset. The exact biological causes of postpartum
disorders remain unknown, but postpartum depression usually
stems from the same type of risk factors that prompt other forms of
depression."' Although depression is a common disorder, there is
little reason to think that depressed men and women in the general
population would receive the same level of blanket protection if they
kill under the alleged effects of the disorder. As such, Infanticide
Acts clearly treat mothers differently by affording them special,
although unnecessary, protections.
The Acts also fail to take into account other extenuating circum-
stances, such as a woman's knowledge that she might be at risk for
postpartum psychosis.135 A woman's awareness of this risk would
likely make her more culpable than another mother who has
never experienced postpartum symptoms. Under the laws of some
jurisdictions, a woman with prior knowledge of her condition might
be held "liable for reckless homicide for her omission in taking
steps to avoid a substantial and unjustifiable risk of which she was
aware."'36 Infanticide Acts ignore such differences and place all
violent mothers in the same category. The Acts, therefore, fail to
acknowledge the reality of postpartum disorders. In reality, women
who experience the effects of postpartum psychosis after the birth
of one child are at a very high risk for the same symptoms should
they choose to give birth again. 3 v For this reason, most doctors
134. See id. at 117 (stating that postpartum depression occurs as a result of factors
including "depression generally, including genetic factors, a previous tendency to depression,
adverse events, disturbed relationships, lack of support and social isolation" (quoting I.
Brockington, Diagnosis and Management of Postpartum Disorders: A Review, 3 W.
PSYCHIATRY 89, 91 (2004))).
135. Women who experience postpartum psychosis once are often at a high risk for the
same symptoms if they give birth again. See id. at 118 ('The two factors most indicative of
a woman's risk for future postpartum depressive disorders are whether she suffered
previously from a postpartum depressive disorder, and whether she suffered a previous
depression related to pregnancy.'). This was the case with Andrea Yates, who experienced
similar symptoms following the births of each of her children.
136. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 3, at 156.
137. Id. at 118 (citing C. Kelly, The Legacy of Too Little, Too Late: The Inconsistent
Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis as a Defense to Infanticide, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POLVY 19, 254 (2002)) ("The two factors most indicative of a woman's risk for future
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strongly advise that women who experience the symptoms of
postpartum psychosis do not become pregnant again. Such was the
case for Andrea Yates.13 The blanket protection granted to all
violent mothers by existing Infanticide Acts, regardless of a
woman's actual psychological condition or surrounding circum-
stances, reflects a belief that mothers should be treated leniently
simply because they are mothers.
B. Misplaced Belief that Women Should Be Treated Lightly for
Violent Crimes
The Infanticide Acts in both England and Canada accommodate
"a collective sense that women should be treated lightly for certain
crimes."'39 The Acts are not premised upon any true biological data,
as no link to postpartum hormones and female violence has been
firmly established. 4 ° In this way, the Acts reflect a disturbing type
of "myth-making by legislation."'' Not surprisingly, a general
leniency toward women who kill prompted the initial adoption of
both Acts. In England and Canada, murder charges originally
resulted in capital punishment, and juries had become unwilling to
find a female defendant guilty when they knew that her sentence
would require execution. 142 As a result, the British Act eliminated
the necessity of imposing murder sentences on female defendants;
Canada's Act accomplished the same goal.'43
The Acts have had their intended effects. Women who kill an
infant within the first year of its life receive minimal sentences in
postpartum depressive disorders are whether she suffered previously from a postpartum
depressive disorder, and whether she suffered a previous depression related to pregnancy.").
138. Resnick, supra note 84, at 148 ('In spite of contrary advice from her treating
psychiatrist about the high rate of recurrence of postpartum depression, Mrs. Yates and her
husband decided to have another baby.").
139. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 91.
140. See id. at 80 ("The point of the Infanticide Act was not that British doctors had
suddenly discovered a link between postpartum hormones and violent behavior. To this day
that link hasn't been categorically established.").
141. Id. at 91 (citing British criminologist Nigel Walker).
142. See Walker, supra note 17, at 206.
143. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 80 ("For instance, following five thousand coroner's
inquests into child deaths ... in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century, only thirty-nine
convictions for child murder resulted, and none of those women were executed.").
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both England and Canada.'44 The presumptions in favor of violent
mothers and the high burden of proof placed on the government
make the Acts difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. In Canada,
for instance, a mother need not prove anything, but the Crown must
prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother was fully
recovered from the effects of giving birth and that her mind was not
disturbed by the effects of giving birth."'45 In a recent case, a court
recognized that the Crown's burden is nearly impossible in light of
the Infanticide Act.'46 Since the enactment of the Act in 1948, no
Canadian mother has served a sentence longer than five years.147 In
England, the vast majority of women receive sentences for man-
slaughter, usually resulting in probation and counseling rather
than prison sentences. 4 '
In reducing punishment for women who kill their children, the
Infanticide Acts encompass a general belief that "the homicidal
mother is more a threat to herself than to society." 4 ' This reasoning
devalues the men and children whose lives are changed irreversibly
as a result of maternal infanticide. Although existing Infanticide
Acts have affected the types of punishment women receive for their
crimes, they have in no way helped to prevent infanticide from
occurring in the first place. Infanticide continues to pose a signifi-
cant problem. In England, for instance, infants younger than twelve
months have the highest homicide victimization rate of any age
group. 50 Due to high rates of underreporting of infant deaths, there
is reason to believe that even more infants have become victims of
homicide than current statistics suggest.l5 ' In catering to violent
women, Infanticide Acts have failed those who need protection the
most.
144. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
145. Walker, supra note 17, at 206 (citing The Queen v. Krystal Anna Coombs, 2003
W.C.B.J. LEXIS 2646, at 49 (2003)).
146. Id. (citing Coombs, 2003 W.C.B.J. LEXIS at 34).
147. Id. at 205 (citing Coombs, 2003 W.C.B.J. LEXIS at 18-19).
148. See SPINELLI, supra note 128, at 9.
149. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 3, at 89.
150. Fiona Brookman & Jane Nolan, 77e Dark Figure of Infanticide in England and
Wales, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 869, 869-70 (2006) (noting that children younger than
one year of age are as many as three or four times more likely to fall victim to homicide than
any other age group).
151. Id. at 870.
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III. ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ADOPTION OF A GENDER-SPECIFIC
INSANITY STANDARD
A. Overview of Existing Insanity Standards
Although the American legal system responded more slowly than
its Canadian and British counterparts, it too has begun to embrace
the medicalization of maternal killings.'52 To date, no Infanticide
Act or other relevant statutes exist in the United States. Since the
1980s, however, courts have permitted use of the insanity defense
in cases involving mothers who suffer from the alleged effects of
postpartum psychosis. Postpartum psychosis is considered a rare
and serious mental condition, which occurs in approximately one to
four out of every 1000 women who give birth. 153 Symptoms of the
disorder include severe delusions, illogical thoughts and behavior,
and possible suicidal or homicidal tendencies. 154 Female defendants
must prove that, as a result of the disorder, they meet the require-
ments of the insanity defense in a given jurisdiction. Yates's saga
brought national attention to the use of postpartum psychosis as a
partial defense in cases of infanticide. Yates, who had been under
psychiatric care since the birth of her fourth child in 1999,15
pleaded not guilty to her childrens' murders by reason of insanity.15
A number of scholars argue that current insanity standards,
which are gender-neutral, fail to accommodate women suffering
from postpartum psychosis.'57 They support the development of new
gender-specific statutes, which would cater exclusively to mothers
who kill their children. To the contrary, American jurisdictions
should not develop gender-specific insanity standards, because: (a)
current gender-neutral insanity standards have proven effective in
accommodating women who suffer from postpartum psychosis; (b)
the use of a gender-specific standard promotes dangerous leniency
152. Recently introduced legislation in both the House and Senate regarding postpartum
mental disorder provides further evidence of this fact. See supra note 18.
153. Connell, supra note 22, at 146.
154. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 43, at 77; supra notes 130-31 and accompanying
text.
155. Resnick, supra note 84, at 148.
156. See Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tx. Crim. App. 2005).
157. See supra note 22.
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toward female defendants; and (c) a gender-specific standard
would embrace and perpetuate false ideas about women and
violence.
Even without clear mandates from the American psychiatric
community,158 current insanity standards have accommodated
female defendants who claim to suffer from postpartum psychosis.
The two modern formulations of the insanity defense in American
jurisdictions are: (1) the M'Naghten test and (2) the Model Penal
Code (MPC) or American Law Institute (ALT) test. Under the most
stringent of these, the M'Naghten test, a defendant must show that
she suffered from a mental disease or defect and that, as a result,
she either (1) did not know the nature of the act she committed or
(2) did not know it was wrong.' Under the MPC standard, a
defendant proves insanity by meeting either prong of a two-prong
test. This two-prong test dictates that a defendant must show that
she 'lack[ed] substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminal-
ity [wrongfulness] of [her] conduct or to conform [her] conduct to the
requirements of the law," as a result of mental disease or defect. 6 °
Critics of the M'Naghten test in cases of maternal infanticide and
filicide argue that the nature of postpartum psychosis makes it
difficult for a woman to meet the requirements of the test. Specifi-
cally, because a woman "may have varying degrees of sanity
throughout the postpartum period," determining whether she knew
right from wrong at the time she committed the crime becomes a
difficult task. 1' Often, women who suffer from postpartum
psychosis "get treated, the hormones dissipate and they are totally
sane."16 2 Critics suggest that by the time a woman appears before
a jury, the insanity defense "[is] a hard sell, unless you really
158. To date, postpartum psychiatric illness has not been wholly embraced by the
American medical community. Medical experts do not "agree about the nature of postpartum
mental disorders and their capacity to cause infanticide." MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 43,
at 11. The current American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), which serves as the main authority on mental illnesses, does
not include postpartum psychosis as a specific disorder. Id.
159. See RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF
DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN 1-2 (1981).
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
161. Connell, supra note 22, at 148.
162. David Williams, Postpartum Psychosis: A Difficult Defense, CNN.com, Aug. 8, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/28/postpartum.defense (quoting Michelle Oberman).
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understand the process of postpartum psychosis."'63 In addition,
because medical experts fail to agree on the nature and causes of
postpartum psychoses, expert testimony may prove unreliable"6
The MPC standard enjoys greater support from proponents of the
postpartum psychosis defense. Unlike the M'Naghten test, the MPC
formulation does not require "total incapacity."'65 Furthermore,
under this test, "the ability to intellectually 'know' that conduct is
wrong is conjoined with an understanding of the moral and legal
significance of the conduct."'66 The MPC test is generally regarded
as a more favorable one for mothers who kill, "because the 'substan-
tial capacity' language recognizes that impairment can come in
varying degrees."'6 7 Although there are few available decisions from
cases involving postpartum psychosis in jurisdictions that have
adopted this standard, it is possible that a more flexible standard
may result in more successful insanity pleas for women who suffer
from the alleged effects of postpartum psychosis;'68 however, most
of the recent high profile cases involving criminal mothers have
occurred in jurisdictions that use the more stringent M'Naghten
standard. Even in these jurisdictions, women have successfully
raised the defense in cases of infanticide and filicide.
B. Effectiveness of the Current Gender-Neutral Standard
A number of women, including Yates, have successfully pleaded
not guilty in jurisdictions such as Texas, which uses a variant of the
strict M'Naghten standard. 6 9 Yates, who possessed a rich history
of psychiatric troubles, seemed a likely candidate for the
postpartum psychosis defense. 70 Many scholars rely heavily on the
163. Id.
164. Connell, supra note 22, at 148.
165. Id. at 149.
166. Id. at 150.
167. Id. at 149.
168. Id. at 150.
169. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (2003) ("It is an affirmative defense to prosecution
that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or
defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.").
170. Yates underwent numerous periods of psychiatric hospitalizations following the
births of her children. Prior to her children's murder on June 21, 2001, Yates allegedly
thought that television commercials for candy were referring directly to her.
She believed that one commercial was saying she was a "fat pig" and that she
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outcome of Yates's first trial to support their arguments that
current insanity standards are inadequate when applied to female
defendants suffering from postpartum psychosis.' 7 ' In March of
2002, during her first trial, a Texas jury rejected the defense and
found Yates guilty of her children's murders. 7 2 The Texas Court of
Appeals, however, overturned the original verdict due to the
materially false testimony of a psychiatrist who testified on behalf
of the prosecution.' 73 In her second trial,174 Yates again entered not
guilty pleas, and on July 26, 2006, the second jury found Yates not
guilty by reason of insanity and committed her to a Texas mental
hospital.'75 Like Yates, mothers in a number of other recent cases
have successfully raised insanity defenses.
Texas has seen a number of high profile cases of infanticide and
filicide, including Yates's, in recent years. Women have successfully
raised the postpartum psychosis defense in each of the cases.
Deanna Laney stoned her two young sons to death and wounded a
third in May 2003 in New Chapel Hill, Texas. 7 ' She allegedly
believed that God had commanded she do so.'7" A Texas jury found
Laney not guilty by reason of insanity, despite the fact that she had
no history of mental illness. 7 ' The jury believed that she had acted
under the influence of postpartum psychosis and that she did not
know the nature of her acts. In 2003, Plano housewife Lisa Diaz
attempted to kill herself and succeeded in killing her two children,
gave her children too much candy. She had a delusional belief since 1999 that
television cameras were placed throughout her home to monitor the quality of
her mothering.
Resnick, supra note 84, at 148.
171. See, e.g., Connell, supra note 22, at 143-44; Prejean, supra note 22, at 1508-09.
172. O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 212.
173. Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tx. Crim. App. 2005).
174. Other important differences also existed between the two juries. For instance, "[t]he
jury that delivered the guilty verdict was death-qualified; all prospects unwilling to impose
the death penalty are automatically eliminated in a Texas capital murder case, substantially
skewing the jury toward conviction and away from a 'not guilty by reason of insanity' verdict,
according to some legal experts." O'MALLEY, supra note 1, at 216.
175. Id.
176. See John Springer, Jury Accepts Insanity Defense for Mother Who Killed Sons,
CNN.com, Apr. 5, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004ILAW/04/05/laney/.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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claiming that she wanted to dispel evil spirits from their bodies. 179
A jury also found Diaz not guilty by reason of insanity.I"0 In another
instance, in 2004, Dena Schlosser cut off her baby daughter's
arms."' The eleven-month-old later died in the hospital, and the
case "ended just as most Texas cases involving mentally ill mothers
who kill their children," with a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity.'82 These mothers prevailed in proving, under the Texas
statute, both that they suffered from postpartum psychosis and that
they did not know that their acts were wrong.
The findings in each of the Texas cases reveal that even the most
stringent insanity standards can fully accommodate defendants
who act under the influence of postpartum psychosis. Statistics
show that a woman's chances of successfully raising the insanity
defense in a case of maternal infanticide or filicide are actually far
better than those of the general criminal defendant.' 83 More
specifically, the insanity defense "has been estimated to be success-
ful in less than 0.1 [percent] (1 in 1000) of all criminal trials."'" In
cases of maternal filicide, however, "studies have found insanity to
be a frequent verdict compared with the 0.1 [percent] standard in
other criminal trials."'85 In a 1979 study, 27 percent of maternal
filicide defendants were acquitted on grounds of insanity. 8 ' In a
1990 study, 15.4 percent of maternal filicide cases resulted in a
decision that the mother was legally insane.8 7 In 1998, 65 percent
179. Tiara M. Ellis & Jennifer Emily, Child Killer To Leave Hospital, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 10, 2006, at 1A.
180. Id.
181. See Jennifer Emily, Schlosser Case Ends With Insanity Ruling, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 8, 2006, at 1A.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., The Use of the Insanity Defense, in REPORT TO
GOv. HUGH L. CAREYONTHE INSANITY DEFENSE INNEWYORK 68-69 (1978) (stating that there
is a general unwillingness to carefully analyze a mother's actions in cases in which she kills
her children and that juries often assume a woman was in fact insane when she did so).
184. GEOFFREY R. MCKEE, WHY MOTHERS KILL: A FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST'S CASEBOOK
20 (2006) (citing G. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS (2d ed.
1997), and H. Turner & N. Ornstein, Distinguishing the Wicked from the Mentally Ill, 3 CAL.
LAW. 40-45 (1983)).
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing P. d'Orban, Women Who Kill Their Children, 134 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 560-
71 (1979)).
187. Id. (citing D. Bourget & J.M.W. Bradford, Homicidal Parents, 35 CANADIAN J.
PSYCHIATRY 233-37 (1990)).
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of the filicidal mothers in a studied sample had been adjudicated as
not guilty by reason of insanity. 8 ' In a study of over three hundred
women who committed neonaticide, not a single woman spent more
than one night in jail.'89 The reality is that many "observers sense
the desperation that drives a woman to neonaticide. Prosecutors
sometimes don't prosecute; juries rarely convict; those found guilty
almost never go to jail."'190 Both judges and juries succumb to the
strong inclination to view cases of infanticide and filicide as oddities
that result from rare and external circumstances. In light of such
factors, current insanity standards have proven effective for women
who kill their children under the alleged influence of postpartum
psychosis. The standards may actually better accommodate women
suffering from postpartum psychosis than they do most criminal
defendants with mental disorders.
C. Gender-Specific Standards Promote Dangerous Leniency
Toward Female Defendants, Especially Mothers
Changing the insanity standard unnecessarily to a gender-
specific one threatens to continue a trend of "chivalry justice" based
upon women's perceived passivity. 9' The insanity defense already
serves as one means by which violent women are legally pathol-
ogized, and the use of postpartum psychosis as a partial defense
raises important questions about legal approaches to female
violence. The failure to apply a similar defense to male defendants
provides further proof of the discrepancies that exist in current
laws.
Substantial evidence has existed for some time that fathers
experience significant psychological symptoms following the birth
of a child. They experience, for instance, the symptoms of post-
partum depression at rates similar to their female counterparts.
92
A recent study by the American Psychological Association (APA)
188. Id. (citing G.R. McKee & S.J. Shea, Maternal Filicide:A Cross-National Comparison,
54 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 679-87 (1998)).
189. See Steven Pinker, Why They Kill Their Newborns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at
SM52.
190. Id.
191. See PEARSON, supra note 30, at 62.
192. Glenn Collins, Relationships; Fathers Get Postpartum Blues, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1981, at B14.
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indicates that one in ten men meet the standards for severe
postpartum depression.'93 In addition, male depression may have
"more negative effects" on children than that of women.194 Some
scientists believe that significant hormonal changes occur in men
with the onset of parenthood, just as they do in women following
childbirth.'95 Postpartum onset "exhaustion psychosis" has also
been diagnosed in men with infants and young children. 9
Exhaustion psychosis may occur due to the stresses of parenthood
and involves many of the symptoms of postpartum psychosis,
including hallucinations, loss of reality, "wild rages," and even
violence.'97 Adoptive mothers have also suffered from the effects of
exhaustion psychosis.'98 Such findings suggest that the hormonal
surges and emotional problems associated with postpartum
psychosis occur in fathers and non-biological mothers and are
closely associated with the stresses and rigors of child-rearing.
Thus, not only should the states maintain gender-neutral insanity
standards, but the postpartum psychosis defense should apply
equally to men and adoptive mothers.
Lawmakers, however, refuse to acknowledge the reality of
postpartum psychosis and other related mental disorders; there has
been no effort to apply a postpartum defense to men who kill their
children. As a result, men consistently receive harsher penalties for
their actions.199 Few women who commit infanticide in the United
States are convicted, and even fewer are incarcerated: "Of those
who are even convicted, about two thirds avoid prison, and the rest
receive an average of seven years."2 ° The disparity is even greater
193. Charlene Laino, Men Also Get Postpartum Depression, WebMD Health News, May
6,2008, http://www.webmd.com/depression/postpartum-depression/news/20080506/men-also-
get-postpartum-depression; see also postpartummen.com, http://www.postpartummen.com
(last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
194. Laino, supra note 193.
195. Id.
196. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 81 ("Recognized in both England and the United States,
exhaustion psychosis refers, essentially, to being so tired that one can't navigate the shoals
of reality anymore.").
197. Id.
198. Id. ("When sleep deprivation combines with the constant demands of a baby, a lack
of support, and insecurity or resentment about parenting, a normally well-balanced person
can come perilously close to violence. This is not just true of biological mothers.").
199. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
200. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 89.
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in other locations, where Infanticide Acts also influence sentencing.
In England, between 1982 and 1989, fathers who killed their
children were far more likely to receive charges of murder than
manslaughter, and three times as many mothers as fathers were
found to be mentally ill when they killed their children.2 °'
In addition, biological defenses do not exist for men in any other
area of the law. The lack of specifically "male" legal defenses raises
some interesting questions. The law strives to take gender into
account when considering female crime, yet largely ignores gender
when dealing with male defendants. Women receive special
treatment for the biological realities that make them women. Men,
on the other hand, receive no special treatment for their "male"
dispositions. The reality is, however, that men may have a natural
propensity for violence.202 At a young age, boys begin to display
aggression, although it may often reflect a "cultural practice" as
much as any natural inclination. 03 Likewise, evidence indicates
that merely holding a gun causes men's testosterone levels to rise,
rendering them more prone to violent behavior.0 4 Why then, are
men not afforded even more protections than women, given the fact
that they may be biologically prone to violent acts? Why can they
not, for instance, "rape and claim testosterone poisoning"?205 The
law does not permit men to blame their acts on the nature of
masculinity, even though testosterone is commonly associated with
violence and aggression. The absence of male-oriented defenses
indicates that laws catering to violent women stem from the desire
to explain away female violence and not from any sophisticated
assessments of culpability. Such laws promote a dangerous,
unnecessary, and highly unfair breed of leniency toward women
who kill.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 11 ("Visible aggression is a masculine display, which, many parents insist,
shows up early in boys.").
203. Id. at 12 (suggesting that the aggressive behavior of young boys reflects "posturing,"
based upon cultural norms, and not necessarily a natural propensity toward violence).
204. Daniel J. DeNoon, Guns Up Testosterone, Male Aggression, WebMD Medical News,
July 28, 2006, httpJ/www.webmd.com/news/20060728/guns-up-testosterone-male-aggression.
205. Postpartum Depression To Be Tested As a Defense, 2 North Jersey Moms Set to Blame
Disorder, THE RECORD, July 2, 2001, at Al.
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D. Gender-Specific Standards Embrace and Perpetuate False
Ideas About Women and Violence
A gender-specific model will further cater to the tendency to
deny female aggression. Because this tendency already exists, and
because women already receive lighter penalties for their crimes
than men, there is no need to enact a gender-specific insanity
standard. The desire to do so stems from a misplaced belief that
only women who are insane or evil commit infanticide.2"6 This is
simply not the case. Gender-specific insanity standards threaten to
further perpetuate misconceptions about female violence. Just as
the battered woman defense presupposes that women cannot resist
certain types of pressure, a gender-specific postpartum psychosis
defense presupposes that women are weak and ruled by their
hormones. These assumptions are not grounded in reality, and
mothers should not receive special treatment from the law.20 7
Fortunately, some countries have begun to recognize the mis-
conceptions codified in their statutes. In 1997, the New South
Wales Law Reform Commission met to make recommendations
about the application of postpartum psychosis in Australian law
and acknowledged several dangerous tendencies. 2 ' For instance,
the Commission found that women received "special treatment" due
to the use of a gender-specific law and determined that the law was
premised upon the faulty belief that women "are naturally suscepti-
ble to mental instability as a result of giving birth" and therefore
"inherently unstable because of their biology."2 9 As the commission
further recognized, "[n]o other crime is excused on the basis of
social or economic necessity or adversity alone. 210 Permitting
special treatment for women, based upon their biological makeup,
"reinforces a view of women as especially weak and vulnerable
because of their sex."'21' American jurisdictions should take heed of
the same troubling issues and allow both women and men to raise
206. See SPINELLI, supra note 128, at 10.
207. Id. at 16 (opining that "seen against the backdrop of the construction of motherhood,
on some occasions this terrible crime [infanticide] may be all but inevitable").
208. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 3, at 171.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 171-72.
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the postpartum psychosis defense under gender-neutral insanity
standards.
CONCLUSION
Cultural values concerning femininity pervade the American
legal system and become particularly clear in cases involving
mothers who kill their children. The treatment of women who
commit infanticide and filicide in American jurisdictions raises
critical questions about the legal system's treatment of violent
women in general. To the extent that decisions concerning punish-
ment reflect the collective conscience, punishment itself provides an
opportunity to "reinforc[e] and regenerat[e] the shared values and
normative conventions that sustain social solidarity. 212 What a
society chooses to punish reveals a great deal about what it deems
most important. The denial of female aggression points to the
troubling possibility that preserving myths of female passivity has
become more important than protecting children and disciplining
those women who commit heinous crimes. The adoption of another
Infanticide Act or a gender-specific insanity standard will ensure
that such myths persist.
To the extent that science and values, in addition to the law,
shape the outcomes in cases involving mothers who kill, a compre-
hensive solution is the only one that will change the face of current
law and thought. As Yates's case shows, current insanity standards
can effectively accommodate women suffering from postpartum
psychosis. Mothers who kill as a result of the disorder have proven
far more successful than most criminal defendants in raising the
insanity defense. Current gender-neutral insanity standards should
not be changed. Existing defenses should also be applied more
broadly, in order to allow men and adoptive mothers to raise the
postpartum psychosis defense in certain cases.
The tendency to deny female aggression must cease, as it
"radically impedes our ability to recognize dimensions of power that
have nothing to do with formal structures of patriarchy. 213 Perhaps
even more importantly, the denial of female aggression prevents
212. MARK COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFORMATORIES, AND CHAIN GANGS 9 (1997).
213. PEARSON, supra note 30, at 243.
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attempts to understand and prevent such acts in the future.2 14 The
troubling fact exists that women have committed murderous acts,
often against their own families, since antiquity. The continuance
of these acts in modern communities points to obvious problems
that should be dealt with long before they ever reach a courtroom.
The potential for prevention of infanticide is particularly great, as
infanticide and filicide have clearly "identifiable precipitants,
namely, pregnancy and childbirth.""21
Responses to violent women reveal the stubborn assumption that
men "are propelled into conquest by a surge of testosterone," and
women are a "homogenous species of nurturant souls."21 A legal
system that embraces such outdated and incorrect beliefs fails to
treat the real causes of female violence and denies the value of
victims of female violence. The mythic mother poses a real threat
to herself and her children. If American laws further cater to
outdated ideas about femininity and violence, female defendants
will remain imprisoned in a system that deprives them of all real
agency and power. They will remain hidden behind the specter of
myth and stereotype, doomed to play out violent tragedies and don
masks of passivity and innocence. There is little justice in that, for
the murderous Madonna or the children at her feet.
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